For readers seeking some action the narrow escape of Somerville fleet from Nagumo's carrier force is narrated in superb detail; as are the later RN carrier raids on Sumatra and the Nicobars.

The fleet withdrew first to Java and, following the fall of Singapore, to Trincomalee, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka). Force A radar detected the air strike on Dorsetshire's force at 13:44, putting the aircraft 34 miles (55 km) to the northeast.Operating from secret bases, light coastal forces of the Royal Navy and the Royal Indian Navy swooped on the unarmed or lightly armed craft and sank them under the nose of the Jap shore positions.

What I liked is that the author provides sufficient maps and charts in the proper place in the book so that we can follow both the Japanese and British movements. The heaviest part of this task was borne by the Merchant Navy, but each ship required escort through Indian Ocean waters, now infested with Jap and German U-boats. Michał Piegzik’s first look at the Japanese 1942 Indian Ocean campaign offered a wealth of information, but visually centred mainly on Japanese material. At dawn, Japanese aerial reconnaissance aircraft flew off to the south-west and north-west; they would fly out to a maximum of 200 miles (320 km) over the next few hours. The Japanese aircraft carriers required maintenance and replenishment after months of intensive operations, [61] and there was already difficulty in maintaining the strength of frontline air units.It is rather short with just 218 pages of text and it covers not only naval warfare in the Indian Ocean 1942-44 but also the development of carrier warfare and naval air power of a larger area. From the strategic point of view, the Japanese offensive in the Indian Ocean was the only moment in the Second World War when the Axis forces could coordinate their efforts to severely threaten the position of the British Empire in the crucial Middle Eastern and Indian theatres. After the Battle of Midway in June, it was realized that there was no longer the threat of major Japanese naval activity in the Indian Ocean. Notably, a submarine group patrolling off East Africa attacked the harbour at Diego-Suarez, Madagascar, while the Allies were capturing the island. At about 16:00 on 4 April, PBY Catalina flying boat (AJ155/QL-A) from the Royal Canadian Air Force's (RCAF) 413 Squadron flown by Squadron Leader Leonard Birchall spotted Nagumo's fleet 360 mi (310 nmi; 580 km) south-east of Ceylon [24] [25] on a course that would have entered Somerville's previous patrol area from the south.

They were taken to Singapore where they were tortured and imprisoned; finally in August 1945 they were executed by the Japanese military authorities four days after the Japanese surrender. Even now there are U-Boats in the Indian Ocean, but the same technique of air-sea co-operation which gained the Battle of the Atlantic is winning the Battle of the Indian Ocean. These attacks were supposed to divert the Japanese from the American assaults in the Central Pacific at the same time.There were two resulting revisions to the 16:00 sighting, which were transmitted to Somerville at 18:00 and 18:17 respectively, and differed significantly from the other and the original report. Eastward, the deterioration was still more rapid as the Americans stepped with 700 league boots across the Pacific islands, marching on the Philippines. At least one submarine was sent to scout the Maldive Islands but failed to detect Port T at Addu Atoll.

in Indian waters, to be ready to deal with any attempt by the enemy to command those waters with light forces only. Somerville planned to evade the Japanese during the day and close to launch torpedo strikes with radar-equipped Fairey Albacore bombers during the night. The Eastern Fleet is relatively unknown today since the operations in the Indian Ocean receive little coverage beyond the loss of the Prince of Wales and Repulse at the beginning of the war. The British Admiral Somerville learned two expensive lessons when he lost the cream of his striking forces when Prince of Wales and Repulse were sunk by aircraft off Malaya in 1941. The raid demonstrated that the RAF was too weak to defend Ceylon and the naval anchorages, [3] and that the navy was ill-prepared to meet a Japanese carrier force.The Japanese realized surprise was lost after intercepting a signal from Colombo asking QL-A to repeat its report. At 07:16 another Catalina from 413 Squadron RCAF spotted the Japanese fleet, but was shot down while reporting. It was ringed by significant British and Commonwealth possessions and much of the strategic supplies needed in peace and war had to pass across it: i.